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How sanctions and the pandemic affect Iran’s economy 
Djavad Salehi-Isfahani 
 
Introduction  
 
Iran has been under international 
sanctions of one kind or another for four 
decades, but its economy has never 
been as bad as it is now.  In May 2018, 
the Trump administration began its 
campaign of maximum pressure to 
force Iran to renegotiate the Iran nuclear 
deal.  This deal, officially known as the 
Joint Comprehensive Program of Action 
(JCPOA), was signed on July 2015 but 
only eased the sanctions for two years.  
During those two years, the economy 
rebounded but then fell into recession.  
Economic growth turned from 13 
percent in 2016 to minus 7.6 percent in 
2019.   
And now, since February 2020, 
the country has been hit by the Covid-
19 pandemic.  The two shocks together 
have put unprecedented pressure on 
the lives of ordinary Iranians. 
The pandemic and sanctions 
both undermine economic recovery, but 
they do that in different ways.   
The impact of sanctions on Iran’s 
economy is through reduction in oil 
exports and cutting off Iran from the 
global financial system.  The former has 
a silver lining in terms of promoting 
import substitution and non-oil exports, 
a development strategy which draws 
support from a large section of Iran’s 
leadership, including the Supreme 
Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.  The 
latter, which obstructs Iran’s global 
trade, including the expansion of non-oil 
exports, is uniformly opposed in Iran. 
The economic damage from 
reduced oil exports are well-known.  
They cut government revenues and the 
supply foreign exchange, both of which 
cause inflation to rise and hurt living 
standards.   In 2012 and 2018, with the 
tightening of sanctions and drop in oil 
exports, Iran’s currency, the rial, fell by 
about 300 percent each time, spiking 
inflation.   
Sanctions have so far come with 
a silver lining because the Iranian 
government has allowed the rial to 
depreciate, promoting import 
substitution. As the price of imported 
goods rise, domestic producers are 
encouraged to increase their production 
and as the price of Iran’s non-oil exports 
drop, Iranian producers can increase 
their exports.  This is the reason why 
employment has continued to increase 
during Trump’s maximum pressure 
campaign and non-oil GDP increased 
by 1.1 percent during the Iranian year 
2019/2020 (March 21, 2019 to March 
20, 2020) according to Iran’s Central 
Bank (Iran’s Statistical Center 
estimated a 0.6 percent drop). 
 
The pandemic  
 
The pandemic has been similar 
to the experience of other countries, 
mainly resulting from social distancing 
and loss of jobs and production.   The 
pandemic arrived in Iran sometime last 
winter. It was officially acknowledged in 
late February and with some delay.  
Very quickly, the pandemic spread 
throughout the country and Iran 
became a major epicenter of the 
coronavirus epidemic outside of China.   
The figures below show the pace 
and the spread of the pandemic in Iran 
and Saudi Arabia.  The comparison with 
Saudi Arabia is interesting because the 
two countries face very different 
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financial situations.  Covid-19 arrived in 
Iran much earlier, in February 2019, and 
peaked relatively quickly.  Iran adopted 
social distancing rules during March 
and April, but abandoned them, arguing 
that saving the economy had priority.  
Sure enough, by early May the trend in 
cases and deaths reversed, reaching 
previous peaks.   
The contrast with Saudi Arabia in 
the number of deaths is sharper, which 
have been much higher in Iran.  Being 
in a stronger financial position, SA 
avoided the large number of deaths (1.5 
per day per million) that Iran suffered in 
March and April.  The higher number of 
cases in SA is in part caused by much 
greater testing there.   
The limited testing and the 
higher number of deaths per million in 
Iran are evidence of the toll that the 
weak economy and the tight public 
purse have taken on Iranian public 
health. 
 
Fig 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While in Iran the number of 
fatalities from the pandemic may not 
return to the levels we saw in spring, for 
the economy the worst is still ahead.  
The forecast by international 
organizations of 7-8% drop in Iran’s 
GDP for 2020 will be presumably all 
coming from domestic non-oil 
production, which is likely because of 
Covid-19. Earlier forecasts were too 
pessimistic because they gave a large 
role to oil, which is no longer important 
in Iran’s economy.  Going forward, 
employment and income will depend on 
keeping the momentum in domestic 
production going, which is difficult with 
the pandemic.   
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Resulting from devaluation, this 
momentum has come at a very high 
cost in terms of the living standards of 
ordinary Iranians. During 2019/202, 
when the pandemic was absent for 10 
months of the year, household per 
capita expenditures fell by 9.8% in rural 
areas and 11.6% in urban areas.  
 
Fig 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The government has tried hard 
to prevent extreme poverty from rising, 
and given its cash transfer programs it 
has probably succeeded.  Iran is one of 
a few countries with a nearly universal 
cash transfer program aimed at 
alleviating poverty.  Since 2011, when it 
first went into effect, inflation had 
reduced its effectiveness in poverty 
reduction.  Then, in November 2019, as 
compensation for a hefty increase in 
gasoline prices, the government 
increased the amount of the transfers, 
to about 10 percent of the median 
household income.  In addition, in June 
2020, about 49 million lower income 
individuals who were given shares of 
public enterprises a decade ago, were 
allowed to sell their shares on the 
booming Tehran Stock Exchange.  The 
cash from the sale of the shares, valued 
at over 100 million rials (about $3000-
$4000 PPP) is an obvious boost for the 
poor, but for the most needy who may 
choose to sell their shares and spend 
the proceeds, it will be a one-time boost 
only. 
Iran entered the crisis with 
relatively low poverty rates – near zero 
with the $1.90 (Purchasing Power 
Parity) per person per day with which 
the World Bank uses to measure 
extreme poverty, and 10 percent with 
the $5.5 line used for middle income 
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countries.  However, more Iranians are 
under this poverty line today than in the 
past two decades because rising prices 
have dragged many lower income 
households to below the poverty line. 
While the Trump administration 
has dealt a serious blow to Iran’s 
economy, its use of the blunt instrument 
of sanctions has punished ordinary 
Iranians. The economy has not 
collapsed as it had hoped back in May 
2018 when it withdrew from the nuclear 
deal imposed its unilateral sanctions, 
nor has the leadership of the Islamic 
Republic caved under pressure.   
While the severity of the crisis 
Iran faces suggests that Tehran may be 
amenable to negotiate with a new US 
president if Trump is not re-elected, 
given how hard they have tried to resist 
maximum pressure, Washington would 
do well to abandon its maximum 
pressure campaign. 
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